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Abstract 
Purpose. In this paper, I argue that corporate foresight can play the important role not 
only for large multinational companies, but also for small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs). Rohrbeck et al (2010) proposed that effective corporate foresight can be 
organized without a process model but with certain capabilities and activities. In this 
paper it is hypothesized that the latter approach could be suitable for SMEs. 
Furthermore, it is hypothesized that organizational future orientation of an SME can be 
also enhanced by engaging in networks with other stakeholders. Therefore, the paper 
aims to explore the different routes to enhance corporate foresight capabilities in SMEs. 
The fundamental research question addressed in this paper is: what are the key 
corporate foresight capabilities and how can these capabilities be built in small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) to enhance strategic thinking and future orientation in 
these companies? More specific objectives are:  
(1) To establish what the key capabilities within the corporate foresight practices are;  
(2) To establish what kind of value contributions can be expected from  corporate 
foresight;  
(3) Based on research results, to propose a benchmarking framework of CF capabilities 
with a distinction between different routes SMEs can take for achieving higher 
value associated with CF.  
(4) To propose how the variables in the networking route could be measured. 
 
The analysis in this paper is comprised of three main parts. The first part is to formally 
establish the need for corporate foresight capabilities in the Lithuanian high technology 
SMEs. The second part, which is the crux of this paper, is to propose the benchmarking 
framework for corporate foresight in SMEs, following three different routes: structural 
approach, cultural approach, networking approach. The third part provides conclusions 
and discussion. 
 
Keywords: Corporate foresight, networking, SMEs, weak signals, weak tie networks, 
strong tie networks, Lithuania. 
JEL codes: D81, D85, L14, M10, O52 
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1. The Concept of Corporate Foresight and 
relevance for Lithuanian SMEs 
 
Corporate foresight has its roots in the futures research discipline. The term “future 
research” is used as a term to describe the whole range of research conducted to help 
organizations, individuals, and governments explore, prepare for, and respond to 
changes in the environment. Many scholars have aimed to differentiate terms used in 
this broad field (e.g., Van Duin, 2008; Rohrbeck, 2010). Due to the cross-functional 
character of corporate foresight in a corporate context, the research on it has typically 
been followed by scholars from different research disciplines, including strategic 
management, technology management, and innovation management. Several scholars 
define foresight as an ability, while others define it as a process, which allows 
identifying future developments in science, technology, economy, and society 
systematically before these developments become trends; it involves methods and 
techniques to gather, assess, and interpret relevant information and to support decision-
making (Coates, 1985; Martin, 1995; Cuhls, 2003; Porter, et al. 2004, Reger 2001). In 
this paper I follow the understanding of corporate foresight as ability, without a 
particular emphasis on processes or other structural elements of a foresight system: 
Corporate Foresight (CF) is an ability that includes any structural or cultural element 
that enables the company to detect discontinuous change early, interpret the 
consequences for the company and formulate effective responses, while at the same 
maintaining a high-quality, coherent and functional forward view. Overall, the 
assumption of corporate foresight is that earlier detection of external changes will allow 
the company to create a temporal competitive advantage (Tsoukas and Shepherd, 2004) 
and increase overall competitiveness (Lackman et al., 2000).   
 
 
Evolution of concept 
 
While the argument about general ignorance towards radical changes is much older, 
Igor Ansoff was the first to observe the inherent ignorance of companies towards 
changes in the environment, resulting in a frequent missing of opportunities and threats. 
Such changes can be identified and anticipated by scanning for so-called weak signals 
(Ansoff et al., 1976).  Weak signals are defined as indicators that make it possible to see 
change early. At the macro level, early weak signs can show that, for example, the 
structure of industry is going to change drastically. An early perception of these signals 
prolongs the time for enterprises to act and makes strategic action possible instead of 
short-term reaction. The problem is to interpret these signals when perceived. The 
identification of the need to use weak signals for the early detection of changes in the 
environment is one of the fundamental findings on which this paper is built. It is 
stated that corporate foresight capabilities allow companies detecting the weak signals, 
interpreting them in an effective way that guides strategy of the company. 
 
6 
 
Equally important was the notion of discontinuities that was introduced by Ansoff and 
later developed further by Christensen under the term of disruption (Ansoff, 1980). 
Discontinuities are characterised as major shifts that can become threats or opportunities 
depending on the perspective and on the reaction by management. The original research 
stream founded by Ansoff by the name of strategic issue management was followed up 
under the name of environmental scanning (Ansoff, 1980). It can be concluded that the 
research stream on environmental scanning has produced the foundation for corporate 
foresight by developing the concept of weak signals and identifying the environment as 
the source of future-oriented information. A recent study by Danneels showed that 
environmental scanning positively influences the ability of a firm to build new 
competencies (Danneels, 2008) thus building the basis for considering environmental 
scanning vital to managing discontinuous change. Empirical evidence was collected that 
indicates that high-performing companies scan more frequently, use a larger variety of 
information sources, and tailor their scanning systems to fit the context of the company 
(Daft et al., 1988, Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom, 1996).  
 
A further development was made with the integration of the discussion on how 
organizations create sense from gathered information (Daft & Weick, 1984) and how 
they use weak signals as a basis for decision making. In the 70s a parallel research 
stream was developed under the term of forecasting. It explored new methods for using 
past data to predict future directions of change (Godet, 1979; Wilson, 1973). This 
research was further driven by the emergence of national (macro level) foresight 
programs aimed at advising policy makers on which technology to invest in (Blind et 
al., 1999). The terms future studies or future research have been used in a broader sense 
for any research aimed at identifying ways to make sense of or predict future directions 
(Gordon et al., 2005; Slaughter, 1998). The investigation of the future from a company 
(micro level) perspective was further developed under the term of strategic foresight 
and also sometimes referred to as corporate foresight (Becker, 2002; Ruff, 2006).  
 
A large set of future-oriented techniques and methods have been developed and applied: 
roadmaps and scenarios are by far the most popular ones. But there are many others, 
e.g., Delphi, relevance trees, cross impact analysis, simulation modelling and systems 
dynamics, and game theory. The latest concept of Organizational Future Orientation 
(OFO) introduced by Rohrbeck in 2010 integrates both research on foresight 
methods and research on corporate foresight as a process (implying that there is a 
corporate foresight function, possibly also a corporate foresight unit). Moreover, 
according to Rohrbeck (2010) ability of organizational future orientation can be build 
upon a corporate foresight unit, that utilizes foresight methods, but also including the 
possibility that a firm builds its future orientation upon other means, such as 
encouraging all employees to look for external change and empowering them to respond 
to this change with individual initiative, possibly through corporate venturing schemes.  
 
Interestingly, the research available suggest there is a shift in approaches to corporate 
foresight since the 50s-60s and nowadays. Van der Duin (2004), Danheim and Uertz 
(2008) and Rohrbeck (2010) compared the evolution of future research in companies 
with their innovation processes. In their analysis, they show that the technology focus of 
corporate innovation management in the 1950s and 1960s was equally present in the 
way companies were exploring the future. And while the innovation processes changed 
over time to include the market perspective and later networking as a way to boost the 
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company’s own innovation capacity, so did the future research activities. In the 50s up 
to the 80s future research aimed particularly at forecasting future developments by using 
s-curves, mathematical modelling, and Delphi studies. In the 1990s, the limitations of 
forecasting became apparent, and future research moved away from attempting to 
predict the future toward identifying possible, probable, plausible, and preferable 
futures (Rohrbeck, 2010).   
 
Contemporary research on corporate foresight claims that corporate foresight is 
represented by four different modes (Daheim and Uertz, 2008): (1) the expert-based 
foresight emphasizes knowability by expertise; (2) model-based foresight that aims at 
calculating change by using quantitative and “subjective” models and matrices; (3) 
trend-based foresight aims to react to change and emphasizes projectability by 
development; its main characteristics are trends, weak signals, early warnings, 
development of trend-databases and monitoring systems. Scholars claim that nowadays 
the latter is a predominant mode of foresight activities at corporate level (Daheim and 
Uertz, 2008). The fourth stream views organizational foresight as the interaction 
between the way people simultaneously construe and are constrained by the temporal 
structures that are both enacted and changed through practice (Cunha, 2004). This rather 
pro-active (“shape the future”) than reactive approach that relates to the concept of 
“open” (“collaborative”, “participatory”) foresight is named to be the next generation of 
corporate foresight (Daheim and Uertz, 2008), see Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Development of approaches to corporate foresight  
Dominant CF 
Paradigm 
Expert-based 
Foresight 
Model-based 
Foresight 
Trend-based 
Foresight 
Context-based 
„Open“ Foresight 
Assumption: 
The future can 
be ... 
Known by means 
of expertise 
 
Calculated by 
means of models 
 
Projected by means 
of (scanned) 
developments 
Shaped by means of 
interaction 
 
Key 
Characteristics 
 
Belief in Experts 
dominant, but: 
70s: Turn to the 
qualitative and 
wider 
environment 
First Opening 
towards “soft 
sciences” 
Quantitative and 
“subjective” 
Models 
Extrapolation 
Systems 
Dominated by 
“hard science” 
Trends 
Weak Signals 
Early Warning 
Mix of qualitative 
and quantitative 
Indicators 
 
Integrating “soft” and 
“hard” approaches; 
Understanding & 
Interpreting /evaluating 
change; 
Opening up: 
Participation, 
Interaction & process; 
Action- and innovation-
oriented; 
More attention on 
discontinuities 
Perspective Exploring Change Calculating Change 
Reacting to 
Change 
Understanding 
&Anticipating / 
Shaping Change 
Output 
Delphis, 
Roadmaps, 
Scenarios 
Models & 
Matrixes 
Trend-databases, 
Monitoring 
Systems 
Scenarios; Wild Cards; 
Action 
Plans & Innovation 
Ideas 
Source: Daheim and Uerz, 2008.  
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Corporate Foresight is an emerging research field with growing activities among the 
scientific community. At least 15 major journal exist which frequently publish articles 
related to CF; there are at least 10 highly relevant conferences related to CF held 
regularly. However, more than half of the identified journal articles are written from a 
macro perspective. Even though there has been significant interest in corporate foresight 
activities, few empirical studies address this phenomenon. Another major shortcoming 
in the existing body of knowledge is that empirical research on corporate foresight has 
been mostly carried out in large companies that have higher probability of having 
institutionalized corporate foresight processes. Studies sheding light on the actual 
performance of foresight for and in European business were produced by Reger (2001), 
Müller (2006), Van der Duin (2006), Schwarz (2006), Daheim and Uertz (2006, 2008) 
and Rohrbeck (2007, 2009, 2010). Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are “a 
white spot in corporate foresight research” (Jannek & Burmeister, 2008). The foresight 
needs and activities of SMEs have stayed below the radar, even though the value of 
SMEs’ contribution to employment, value creation, and innovation is well recognized. 
Looking at above-mentioned factors illustrates the dilemma: small and medium sized 
enterprises are not familiar with this crucial field of business strategy. 
 
For this paper, the analysis of past literature on corporate foresight provides some 
important insights:  
 
(1) Firstly, there is a trend toward more collaborative approach in corporate foresight 
at micro level. Corporate foresight research has adopted the paradigm that 
participation is crucial to the usage of the foresight insights. In order to ensure the 
success of foresight activities, experts, decision makers and other stakeholders need 
to be integrated into the process (Barker and Smith, 1995; Rohrbeck, 2010, Daheim 
and Uertz, 2008). In addition, it has been argued that the dominant logic in 
organizations hinders the acknowledgement of change and hinders acceptance of 
alternative development paths. The task, therefore, of corporate foresight would be 
to create doubt about basic assumptions in the firm by running participatory 
foresight exercises (Blackman and Henderson, 2004). Additional benefits of using 
participatory methods to explore possible futures arise from the process itself. It has 
been shown that the process of scenario planning can play the role of strategic 
conversation and enhance organizational learning (Chermack et al., 2006; 
Rohrbeck, 2010). 
(2) Secondly, evidence demonstrates that there is not necessarily a specific corporate 
foresight department or unit in the corporate landscape (Becker, 2002; Daheim and 
Uertz, 2008; Rohrbeck, 2010). Rohrbeck et al (2010) proposes that effective 
corporate foresight can also be organized without a process model but with 
certain capabilities and activities. In the research carried out by Rohrbeck (2010), 
it was proved by one of the case studies at an US-based multinational energy 
systems manufacturer in Europe (further on referred to as „Enerco“). In this 
research it is hypothesized that the latter approach could be suitable for SMEs 
willing to enhance their organizational future orientation.  
(3) Finally, corporate foresight research is still driven by the aim to identify successful 
methods and processes. To enhance the maturity of corporate foresight research and 
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to move closer to theory development, a common framework with its constituting 
elements is needed. Such a framework can be an important step for developing 
testable constructs and hypotheses and thus can lead the transition to deductive 
research. Rohrbeck (2010) proposed a maturity model that allows assessing the 
strength of the future orientation of an organisation and includes criteria to measure 
the ability of horizon scanning systems to trigger actions. According to the research 
by Rohrbeck et al (2007, 2010) successful corporate foresight – and hence making 
use of the gained insights from foresight – depends on capabilities such as culture 
(e.g. willingness to share), organization (e.g. integration of foresight activities 
within processes of innovation management or strategic management), method 
sophistication, information usage (e.g. sources and scope), and people & networks 
(especially the internal communication and the use of internal and external 
networks). Study by Rohrbeck and the maturity model provides valuable insights. 
However, the study is based on case studies and survey that explored corporate 
foresight practices in large companies. How SMEs could benefit from these 
practices remains a conundrum.  
 
 
Corporate Foresight in SMEs 
 
To define a small and medium sized enterprise, a definition of SME by the European 
Commission is applied in this paper: “The category of micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and 
which have an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million euro, and/or an annual 
balance sheet total not exceeding 43 million euro” (Extract of Article 2 of the Annex of 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC). According to the new definition, the self-employed, 
family firms, partnerships and associations regularly engaged in an economic activity 
may be considered as enterprises. Small enterprises are defined as enterprises which 
employ fewer than 50 persons and whose annual turnover or annual balance sheet total 
does not exceed 10 million euro. Micro enterprises are defined as enterprises which 
employ fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover or annual balance sheet total 
does not exceed 2 million euro. 
 
The literature on the dynamic view of organizations and corporate change provides the 
overall theoretical basis to understand the need for corporate foresight. The dynamic 
view suggests that organizations need to constantly adapt to their environment to ensure 
long-term survival and economic success (Levinthal, 1992; Teece et al., 1997). A study 
solicited by the Royal Dutch Shell calculated the average life expectancy of a Fortune 
500 company to be less than 40 years (De Geus, 1997). This time span could be even 
shorter for an SME. Within the research stream of corporate change, empirical evidence 
indicates that corporate change is characterized by long periods of small, incremental 
change, which are interrupted by brief periods of discontinuous, radical change (Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1997; Rohrbeck, 2010).  Companies aiming at strategic flexibility will 
need capabilities to detect and interpret changes in the environment. Knowing about the 
change is a prerequisite to successful responses. Companies are faced with disruptions 
in different environmental areas and have to develop capabilities to identify them early 
and react fast. Climate change discussion led to introduction of carbon trading scheme 
in Europe (legislative disruption). Especially technology-driven companies have to scan 
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and monitor their environments continuously in order to maintain their competitiveness 
and being able to develop new promising technologies and use them to move into new 
business fields.  Chances can also arise out of discontinuities if an enterprise is able to 
identify them and react faster than its competitors. According to Rohrbeck (2010), a 
need to build corporate foresight abilities might come from:  
(a) a certain nature of the corporate or innovation strategy, for example aiming to be 
"aggressively growth oriented"; or pursuing an innovation leader strategy; 
(b) a high complexity of the environment; a particularly volatile environment; speed 
of change of market (Rohrbeck, 2010; Rollwagen, Hofmann, & Schneider, 2008). 
(c) In addition, it is worth mentioning that the primary goal of corporate foresight is 
producing a long-term strategic vision, ideas for product innovations or a scenario 
for communication purposes. Therefore, the need is high in industries with a focus 
on long-term orientation – in industries characterised by long product cycles and 
high development costs, such as the chemical and automotive industry, which 
have to constantly monitor and react to the innovation activities of their 
competitors. 
 
These drivers seem to be applicable to both large and small companies. The study by 
Daheim and Uertz (2006) proves that since SMEs operate in highly competitive and 
dynamic markets, it is assumed that their foresight requirements are substantial. New 
trends in the world economy put higher pressure for SMEs to engage in foresight 
activities, especially due to the globalization. Large companies have new possibilities, 
new markets, and more freedom to do business. Liberalisation is leading to the more 
intensive flow of capital and large corporations make use of new conditions; they are 
creating regional and local networks of cooperating companies, mainly small and 
medium sized ones. Networks are created by suppliers, who are providing to large 
corporations flexibility in the accommodation to the regional demand. Large 
multinational corporations are bringing into the relation with SME´s new quality 
standards. For small and medium sized companies it means higher pressure to fulfil 
expectations of large multinational corporations (MNC) and the driving force for them 
is to penetrate to networks with new innovative products and services, which could be 
achieved by technology innovation, management innovation. The more a small and 
medium sized company is willing to change, the more it depends on foresight 
knowledge to provide security for investment decisions.  
 
Dasheim and Uertz in their study also proved that SMEs do carry out certain foresight 
activities and have certain corporate foresight capabilities: 
- 85% of the surveyed German SMEs regularly monitored developments in their 
markets and industries;  
- 29% frequently and 61% sometimes scanned markets and industries they were not 
competing in for new developments;  
- 74% of the SMEs surveyed regularly monitored issues, trends and new technologies 
considered relevant for their business (sometimes: 26%);  
- additionally, 30% often scanned their environments for new issues, trends and 
technologies whose relevance cannot yet be assessed (sometimes: 60%) (Jannek and 
Burmeister, 2007).  
 
Various foresight methods for scanning and monitoring, analysis and idea transfer are 
used in SMEs. Most frequently applied are: (a) brainstorming (regularly: 38%, 
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sometimes: 51%); (b) desk research, e.g. internet and media analysis (regularly: 40%, 
sometimes: 47%), and (c) expert interviews (regularly: 32%, sometimes: 54%).  These 
methods are not only used most often but also considered the most important ones. In 
contrast, more complex foresight methods, for instance expert Delphi surveys and the 
scenario-method are less relevant and in some cases even unknown (Jannek & 
Burmeister, 2007). Foresight processes in SMEs, according to Jannek & Burmeister 
(2007), were mostly carried out by top management, and also individual employees. In 
many cases, the sales department and individual clients were also involved.  Foresight 
was mainly used for strategic planning and to identify new innovation fields. The same 
study (the only study carried out about corporate foresight in SMEs) indicated that 
problems related to CF occurred when foresight knowledge has to be transformed into 
practical knowledge and ideas for new products and strategies. This transfer as well as 
budget and manpower constraints are also bottlenecks for the implementation of a more 
complex foresight approach. Due to the complexity foresight studies require substantial 
source of financial means, which cannot be covered by SME´s themselves.  Jannek & 
Burmeister (2007) propose that SME executives have to broaden their foresight 
horizons and draw on more elaborate foresight methods better suited to their needs. For 
the highly dynamic markets and business environments they operate in, trend analysis, 
roadmapping and scenarios to explore alternative futures could be more appropriate. 
Additionally, simulation techniques may be useful in SME business contexts strongly 
driven by third parties (e.g. clients, competitors, policymakers). Foresight training 
courses in these more elaborate methods are also essential.  In addition, Corporate 
Foresight is one option to extend the scope of SMEs. Even though most SMEs are B2B 
suppliers, end consumers and social changes may have a considerable impact on their 
business. SME managers should therefore revaluate the importance of this sphere.  
 
The research results outlined are only a first step in the exploration of SMEs’ foresight 
needs and activities. Past research provides these important insights: 
 
(1) First of all, requirements for corporate foresight activities are substantial in 
SMEs, however these needs are so far underestimated in the foresight 
community. For a deeper understanding, benchmarking frameworks of corporate 
foresight activities and capabilities in SMEs could be developed, and SMEs with 
best practice CF activities identified. Therefore, the research community would do 
well to realize the specific needs and capabilities required at SMEs, and the 
constraints they are confronted with.  
(2) The question is whether foresight tools and processes can be downsized or adapted 
to the needs of SMEs. Foresight approaches need to be simplified and become more 
results-oriented. SMEs could be seen as test cases for a new generation of more 
pragmatic foresight concepts to emerge in the long run. Jannek & Burmeister 
(2007) also note that collaboration between companies and external stakeholders 
can be used to improve SMEs’ foresight activities. External sources can provide 
regional scenarios with a time horizon of five to ten years. Companies would then 
adapt these to their specific industries. SMEs could also cooperate in foresight 
networks to generate economies of scale. External experts and scientists can be 
temporarily integrated as desired. Jannek & Burmeister propose a solution for 
SMEs – to be involved in governmental studies, activities of industrial associations, 
chambers of commerce, or technology platforms (Jannek & Burmeister, 2007). It is 
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hypothesized in this research that networking could be a way forward for corporate 
foresight in SMEs. 
 
 
Relevance to Lithuanian SMEs 
 
SMEs had played a pivotal role in Lithuanian economy. Comparing with other Baltic 
States, Lithuanian companies grew mach faster and go beyond the average productivity 
growth of Central European countries focusing more on entering new markets. The role 
of SMEs has become even more important in the period of economic crisis, as small 
business is more flexible to admit market changes. Still, it is a discussion point in terms 
of economic slump as large enterprises clearly have the advantage of mass production in 
capital-intensive processes and high volume products, but smaller enterprises have an 
advantage in niche markets and geographically restricted markets (Bernatonyte, Vilke, 
& Volochovic, 2009). Furthermore, with increasing economic growth, rising standards 
of living and increasing factor costs, many traditional Lithuanian manufacturing 
companies face the risk of failure. While many larger companies are capable of 
producing high quality goods requiring appropriate technologies and have even begun 
to transfer a portion of their manufacturing to other geographically close, lower-cost 
countries (Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine), many small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are still in a state of uncertainty (Mockaitis, 2006). SMEs are inherently 
constrained by their capacity to grow and they usually face much stronger business 
challenges relative to their large counterparts. More importantly, and this is particularly 
important in the globalisation era, is the challenge of an increase in the threat of survival 
that comes from much tougher competition among firms in a globalised business 
environment (Harvie, 2010). 
 
There are approximately 37 SMEs per 1000 inhabitants in Lithuania, which is slightly 
below the EU-27 average of ca 40. On the whole, the Lithuanian share of SMEs in the 
overall number of businesses, compared to that of the EU, is virtually the same. The 
total employment of the SME sector (75 % of the total employment figure) is higher in 
Lithuania than in the EU on average (67 %). From 2002 to 2008, the number of SMEs 
grew with 36 %, much faster than the average EU-growth (13%). In the period 2002-
2008 employment growth of Lithuanian SMEs showed an overall increase of 24%, 
which is well above the EU-average of 12%.  
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Table 2. Structure of SMEs in Lithuania and EU-27 
 Number of enterprises Number of persons employed Value added (billion 
EUR) 
 Value % EU-27  Value % EU-27  Value % EU-27  
Micro 113,840 88,4 91,8 217,485 22,8 29,7 2 11,6 21,0 
Small 12, 021 9,3 6,9 241,469 25,3 20,7 3 23,2 18,9 
Medium 2,613 2,0 1,1 252,582 26,5 17,0 4 29,2 18,0 
SMEs 128,474 99,7 99,8 711,536 74,6 67,4 9 64,0 57,9 
Large 347 0,3 0,2 242,271 25,4 32,6 5 36,0 42,1 
Total 128,821 100.0 100.0 953,807 100.0 100.0 13 100.0 100.0 
Data refer to the non-financial business economy (NACE C-I, K) and represent estimates for 2008. The 
estimates have been developed by EIM Business and Policy Research, based on 2006 Eurostat Structural 
Business Statistics figures2. 
 
 
Figure 1. Numbers of SMEs in Lithuania and EU-27 
 
                                                           
2
 The figures in the table, which cover data on the national level as well as EU-27 aggregates, have been 
derived from European Commission’s Observatory of European SMEs following an estimation and now-
casting methodology developed by EIM Business and Policy Research. The advantage of using Eurostat 
data is that the statistics from different countries have been harmonized and are comparable across 
countries. The disadvantage is that for some countries (including Lithuania) these data are different from 
data published by national authorities. 
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Figure 2. Employment in SMEs in Lithuania and EU-27 
 
 
The contribution of Lithuanian SMEs exceeds that of their EU peers, driven by the 
small and medium segments. Value added of SMEs grew with 151 %, which is more 
than five times faster than the EU average growth of 28 % during the period between 
2002 and 2008. 
 
Figure 3. Value added created by SMEs in Lithuania and EU-27 
 
 
According to the SME Observatory, the share of SME staff with tertiary education 
(55% vs 30%) and the share of SMEs using e-learning applications for training (53% vs 
29%) are significantly higher than the corresponding European benchmark scores. The 
share of SMEs that have new products and the share of SMEs’ turnover from new or 
significantly improved products or services rank above the EU-27 averages. This strong 
performance, intuitively related to innovation, is slightly contradicted by the sub-
average share of SMEs with innovation activities in all SMEs. About a quarter of 
Lithuanian enterprises do business on-line. The percentage of SMEs using e-learning 
applications for training seems to have slowly increased from 47 % in 2004 to 53 % in 
2009. Finally, there had been a decrease in the share of SMEs with innovation activities 
between 2000 and 2006. The available figures for the internationalisation indicators 
also locate Lithuania above the EU-27 average. The share of turnover from export 
stands at 8 %, ahead of the EU average of 6 %. The remaining indicators are in line with 
their respective averages. These include the time required to export or to import, the 
share of SMEs’ income gained abroad and the percentage of inputs purchased outside 
the country. Share of exports by SMEs in the national exports statistics has increased by 
41% in 2002-2008, and in 2008 comprised 73,4% of all country export value. However, 
the capacity to export still remains lower as that of the large companies in Lithuania. 
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Overall, it may be concluded that the importance of the SME sector in the Lithuanian 
economy is very high and still increasing. Share of GDP created by SMEs increased by 
18,7% in 2002-2008 up to the 81,3%, while value added created by SMEs as compared 
to the total value added increased by 7,1% up to 64,1% in 2009. According to the results 
of multifactor regressive analysis forecast for 2010 by Bartkus et.al (2010), the share of 
GDP produced by small and medium sized companies, despite the effects of financial 
and economic crisis, will be increasing, up to 79,66% (Bartkus, 2010). Over the long 
run, underlying structural determinants of the earlier growth trend in the number of 
enterprises in the EU, including the Internet revolution, the growth of the services sector 
and institutional developments favouring self-employment, are expected to remain 
relevant in the coming years. When economic growth seriously picks up again, the 
number of SMEs is expected to resume its upward development (European 
Commission, 2009). 
 
 
2. Routes for enhancing corporate foresight in SMEs 
 
 
The following analysis provides propositions for the conceptual framework for 
benchmarking corporate foresight capabilities in SMEs. In the past, corporate 
foresight research was often based on processes and fixed structures. It was assumed 
that specialized units within the organization collect data by using specific methods like 
scenario analyses and roadmapping. Then recommendations for following processes 
(e.g. innovation management, strategy process) were derived from analyzed collected 
data. In his cross-case analysis, Rohrbeck (2010) identified two directions for building 
high corporate foresight ability: 
 
 
(1) The structured approach, in which corporate foresight is a task that is executed 
according to a process by dedicated units and in which the response to 
discontinuous change is achieved by linking the foresight process to other corporate 
functions through follow-up processes. The structural approach is composed of the 
dimensions on information usage, method sophistication, people, and elements of 
organizational capabilities (Rohrbeck, 2010). 
(2) The cultural approach builds on involving a much larger proportion of employees 
and making them accountable for detecting and responding to weak signals on 
discontinuous change. The organizational reaction is not triggered by dedicated 
foresight and follow-up processes but through traditional processes such as new 
business development processes and corporate entrepreneurships, in which 
individual employees are motivated to take the initiative to explore new business 
fields (Rohrbeck, 2010).  
 
 
In this paper it is hypothesised that a third approach could be also viable for SMEs – 
a networking approach. As Jannek & Burmeister (2007) mentioned in their research, 
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SMEs can overcome their budget-related difficulties in clustering and engaging in meso 
level foresight initiatives.  
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesised approaches (routes) to corporate foresight in SMEs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Route 3: Networks Route 2: Culture Route 1: Structure 
Elements of networks: 
 
1. Strong tie networks: 
suppliers, partners, 
clients 
2. Weak tie networks: 
associations, 
universities 
3. Intermediary sources: 
brochures, TV, etc. 
4. Geographical scope 
Elements of culture: 
 
1. Willingness to share 
accross functions.  
2. Readiness to listen to 
scouts and external sources.  
3. Opennesss of 
organization. 
4. Informal diffusion of 
insights.  
5. Wilingness to test and 
challenge basic 
assumptions.  
6. Incentives. 
 
Encironment Scanning: 
1. Scope. 2.Reach. 3.Time 
horizon. 4.Sources. 
Method sophistication: 
5.Integrat ion capacity. 
6.Communication capacity.7. 
Fit with problem and context. 
Usage and communication: 
8.Mode. 9.Integration with 
other processes. 10.Formal 
diffusion of insights. 
11.Accountability. 12.Top 
Management Involvement. 
  
 
If corporate foresight abilities can be built with either cultural, structural or networking 
elements, then the overall corporate foresight ability of a firm can be represented in a 
diagram with three axes: the culture axis, on which all elements of the cultural approach 
are scored, the structure axes, on which all elements of the structural approach are 
scored, and the networking axes. Combining the three axes creates a corporate foresight 
ability index with three dimensions. In practice, companies using either of the dominant 
approaches may still benefit from the elements of the other dimensions. 
 
 
2.1. Route 1: Formalised Structure of Corporate Foresight 
 
The characteristics of this route refer to the operational in-house capabilities of 
corporate foresight – a formalised process installed in a company. Following this route 
means that the company has the capacity to carry out environmental scanning and 
interpretation using the common methods of corporate foresight in-house. Previous 
empirical research related to this route was completed only for large companies by 
Reger (2001), Müller (2006), Van der Duin (2006), Schwarz (2006), Daheim and Uertz 
(2006, 2008) and Rohrbeck (2007, 2009, 2010). The clusters of characteristics in this 
route would include: 
Corporate Foresight 
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(1) Mode, scope, depth and reach of environmental scanning - the dimension that has 
been studied most frequently by corporate foresight researchers. It describes the kind 
of information that is gathered and fed into a corporate foresight process. Becker has 
assessed the scope, time horizon and sources in his study of 18 interviews with 
European multinational companies. Before him Jain assessed scope and usage of 
information in a survey of Fortune 500 companies. Rohrbeck (2010) also added 
reach that describes the depth to which companies scan their environment. Depth can 
be described by differentiating between current business, adjacent businesses, and 
white spaces. White spaces are areas that currently seem to have no relevance to the 
company but which could breed disruptive changes which are difficult to perceive 
and prepare for. 
 
(2) Method sophistication would describe ability to systematically interpret information 
using methods associated with corporate foresight. Past research was focused 
primarily on establishing knowledge about method usage (Jain, 1984) and giving 
recommendations to managers on which method to choose and in which context 
(Lichtenthaler, 2005; Porter et al., 2004).  Other scholars work on enhancing 
individual methods, such as: (a) the scenario technique (Chermack, 2005; Mietzner 
and Reger, 2005; Van der Heijden, 2005); (b) Delphi technique (Ament, 1970; Ono 
and Wedemeyer, 1994; Rowe and Wright, 1999; Rowe et al., 2005); (c) Cross-
impact analysis (Gordon and Hayward, 1968;  Weimer-Jehle, 2006); (d) Backcasting 
(Quist and Vergragt, 2006); (e) Gaming (Helmer, 1972; Watman, 2003; Oriesek and 
Friedrich, 2003;  Schwarz, 2009). In his study Rohrbeck (2010) aims to find 
measures that capture the capability of the overall method portfolio. 
 
 (3) Information usage and communication capacity would describe what kind of future 
related information enters the management system, how it is interpreted and used in 
the organisation. It has been hypothesized that to respond to discontinuous change it 
is important to foster linkages between units responsible for developing new products 
and units with complementary assets needed to commercialize the innovation. 
Communication capacity describes the usefulness of the method portfolio for 
communicating information and interpretations internally and externally. This can be 
achieved with participation in the method, as is the case for example in roadmapping 
(Phaal et al., 2004), and by producing results that can easily be communicated, as is 
the case with methods such as the scenario technique, which produced an alternative 
future that is transparent and easy to understand by outsiders and thus easy to 
communicate (Mietzner and Reger, 2005; Van der Heijden, 2005).  The cluster 
should include characteristics that describe foresight integration with other 
processes. The expected links are to R&D, innovation management, corporate 
development, marketing, controlling, and strategic management. Accountability 
would describe the extent to which employees are responsible for detecting and 
acting on weak signals. Incentives would describe whether rewards or bonuses are 
awarded to encourage future orientation and a wider vision (Day and Schoemaker, 
2005). Another crucial enabling factor is the top management involvement (also 
referred as commitment) that increases the chances for firmly grounding an internal 
foresight unit within the company, higher visibility and relevance, easier 
implementation of results and recommendations (Reger, 2001; Steger, 2006; 
Rohrbeck, 2007). 
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It can be expected that institutionalisation of foresight approaches is resourceful, hence 
the preliminary hypothesis is formulated that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Larger companies tend to have higher institutionalisation of foresight 
capabilities in-house. 
 
As well, the context characteristics of a company can be related to the usage of 
institutionalisation of foresight in-house: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The more dynamic the internal and external environment of the 
company, the more dynamic its view on strategy, and the more it will use advanced 
methods of futures research in its strategy process. 
 
On the other hand, theoretical approaches that recommend a sophisticated formal 
process are perceived not to work. A standardized approach implies difficulties in 
detecting disruptive changes, as the instrument does not know what to look for. The 
human component is most important when dealing with early awareness. It is essential 
to use structured communication processes and networking activities (Steger 2006).  
 
Hypothesis 3: The more developed are information usage and communication capacity 
characteristics, the higher value achieved. 
 
 
2.2. Route 2: Culture 
 
Most scholars that researched corporate foresight in multinational companies have listed 
cultural barriers and corporate culture among the most important factors that influence 
the value created by corporate foresight. Rohrbeck (2007) and Steger (2006) list cultural 
barriers, such as lack of top management using future insights and lack of 
inclination/motivation to think about the future; institutional barriers, such as hierarchy 
preventing horizontal/ vertical dialogue, lack of incentive to think about the future, 
reward and career system that is hostile to foresight, limited attention of internal 
stakeholders and current controlling systems. Steger calls „open“ corporate culture, that 
allows questioning mental models and abandoning well-trodden prails, allows good 
cooperation among units, an “enabling factor“ to successful implementation of 
corporate foresight (Rohrbeck 2007; Steger 2006). In the dimension of culture, three of 
the five elements could be adopted from Day and Schoemaker (Day and Schoemaker, 
2005). The four elements derived from Day and Schoemaker are (1) willingness to share 
across function, (2) readiness to listen to scouts and external sources, (3) the willingness 
to test and challenge basic assumptions (Day and Schoemaker, 2005).  Study of 
Rohrbeck (2010) adds the element informal communication, which describes the role 
and effectiveness of informal communication in the diffusion of future-oriented 
information and future insights. This element was highlighted particularly by companies 
with weaknesses in formalized processes but with a good track record of surviving and 
succeeding in times of discontinuous change. 
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Overall, the dimension “culture” can be seen as an important enabler for corporate 
foresight systems as well as to some extent a substitute for formal processes. For 
example, it can be argued that if a company manages to encourage (through cultural 
means) its employees to be open to external information and to diffuse it effectively 
throughout the company, then it can be expected that this will support strongly its 
ability to retain a competitive advantage in times of discontinuous change. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The more developed are the cultural characteristics, the higher the value 
characteristics associated with foresight. 
 
2.3. Route 3: Networks  
 
Networking as a route for corporate foresight in Lithuanian SMEs is a focal point of this 
paper. Hence, it is elaborated in more detail in this paper. Considering the great need for 
effective and efficient communication in a corporate foresight system, it can be 
expected that there is a need for strong internal and external networks.  
 
Networks are often described as nodes and branches where the enterprises form the 
nodes and the relationships between the enterprises form the branches. Small and 
medium-sized enterprises, because of their limited resources, use a variety of sources 
and are linked to different networks to obtain the information they need to develop their 
strategy and then to gradually organize their environment. Among other things, 
networks keep them up-to-date with changes in the economy and allow them to take 
advantage of opportunities to innovate, thus remaining ahead of their competitors. One 
of the aims of this paper is to explore how structural features of SMEs networks – 
strong ties, diversity of ties and content of ties – interact with features associated with 
corporate foresight (structured and cultural routes to foresight) to generate value 
associated with corporate foresight. Therefore, the paper addresses the network theory. 
 
 
 
Benefits associated with SME networks 
 
From the strategic management perspective, engagement in networks by itself is seen as 
a source of competitive advantage. Collaboration in innovation networks plays an 
important role for SMEs to gain access to resources not otherwise available or 
affordable (Heide and Stump, 1995). Further, collaboration and interaction between 
SMEs in networks (i.e. with customers, suppliers, public agencies, industry 
associations, foundations, etc.) help to accumulate innovation capabilities (Neergaard 
and Ulhøi, 2006; Lundvall, 1988), at least in part due to greater opportunities for 
learning and knowledge-sharing (Powell et al., 1996; Gomes-Casseres, 1997). It should 
be noted that co-operation is not the only nor in all cases the most appropriate way to 
achieve competitive strength. Several studies conclude that an SME‘s success against 
larger competitors may be improved by its ability to utilize external networks efficiently 
(Nooteboom, 1994; Dogson and Rothwell, 1994). Consequently, in an increasingly 
dynamic environment, (innovation) networks become critically important for the 
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success or even the survival of SMEs. The most important benefits that SMEs can gain 
from the collaboration in innovation networks are (1) an exchange of knowledge and 
competencies (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Powell et al., 1996), (2) reduction of 
financial (Bygrave, 1987) and other risks (Gemünden et al., 1992; Ragatz et al., 1997; 
Levinthal, 1988), (3) support for or even improved access to new markets and 
technologies (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Perez Perez and Sanchez, 2002), and (4) 
protection of intellectual property rights (Liebeskind et al., 1996; see also Arrow, 1962; 
Levin et al., 1987).  
 
According to the study by the Observatory of European SMEs, half of the European 
SMEs co-operate with other SMEs. In the top-ranking group (Italy and four of the 
Nordic countries Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland) more than half of the 
enterprises engage in co-operation. Portugal has the lowest incidence of cooperation 
with less than one in six SMEs engaged in co-operation. Cultural factors seem to 
influence the tendency to co-operate (Observatory of European SMEs, 2003). The most 
frequent motives for SME co-operation is access to new and larger markets, broader 
supply of products, access to know-how and technology, additional production capacity 
and reduced costs. The smallest enterprises most frequently mentioned access to new 
and larger markets as reason for cooperating, while the largest enterprises gave 
preference to cost reduction. Access to labour and access to capital were seldom 
mentioned as a reason for co-operation. The literature on SME co-operation discusses a 
number of objectives, which can be grouped in four categories: 
(1)  Need to secure resources, e.g. labour and capital; SMEs are, as all enterprises, 
constrained by scarce resources. The smaller they are, the more these scarce 
resources limit the scope as well as the volume of the tasks they can successfully 
perform. The need to secure resources is often given as a main motive for SME co-
operation (Isaksen, 1993).  
(2)  Reduced transaction costs; Transaction costs are the costs involved in establishing a 
transaction: ex ante costs to search for the product/service, and to establish the 
transaction; the costs of the transaction itself (contract/agreement), as well as the 
costs involved in monitoring and enforcing the contract. Co-operation may reduce 
uncertainty and thereby reduce transaction costs (Camagni, 1993) - benefits that are 
impossible to measure.  
(3)  Efficient access to markets; Market access has been found to be an important reason 
for SME co-operation. It would be expected that SMEs in countries with small 
domestic markets and/or long distances to large markets should have higher 
tendency for co-operation than in countries with large domestic markets. It should 
be expected that technology intensive industry sectors have highest tendency for 
co-operation (SME Observatory, 2003). 
(4)  Learning and access to technology. Well-chosen partnerships make it possible to 
bypass slow and costly efforts to build one's own capabilities and access to new 
opportunities (Morgan, 1997). 
 
Networks can be differentiated according to the following characteristics (Hämäläinen 
and Schienstock, 2000): 
(1) Vertical and horizontal. Vertical networks connect firms or production activities 
along the value added chain; horizontal networks connect individuals or 
organizations in functional areas, e.g. research, production, marketing (Albu and 
Bell, 1999). In other word, horizontal networks consist of firms producing similar 
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goods and vertical networks comprise firms complementary and interlinked through 
a network of suppliers, service and customer relations. 
(2) Geographic scope. Networks can be local, regional, national, international or global. 
(3) Organizational structure. Networks can be informal, flexible and trust-based, or 
formal and structure based (Lundval and Borras, 1997). 
(4) Duration. Project teams may have collaborations with short term goals; alliances, 
international networks and similar collaborations usually have long term goals. 
(5) Boundaries. Networks differ in their degree of openness, e.g. access to network can 
be restricted and exit costs may be high. However, in general networks are open 
constructs (OECD, 2000). 
(6) Architecture and balance of power. In principle, networks are defined as 
associations with equal rights. However, power relationships between participants 
can be asymmetric (OECD, 2000).  
(7) Stability and trust. In general, networks are a structure of loosely linked actors, so 
that it is easy for new members to join and for established partners to leave. The 
memberships thus can change quite rapidly and the relationships can be relatively 
unstable (OECD, 2000). For our research, characteristics 1 to 4 seem to be the most 
important. 
 
A network can consist of various network partners. Research has identified a large 
variety of activities carried out by SMEs in innovation networks with different partners:  
(1)  Inter-firm cooperation: complementors, but also competitors, collaborate to carry 
out basic research. In addition, such partnerships can solve interface problems when 
a new technology penetrates a market (Gemünden et al., 1996). Suppliers can 
provide production facilities or new component and system technologies which 
improve the technological know-how of the innovating firm.  
(2)  Academia: As a result of network collaboration, SMEs can gain access to university 
resources, such as testing equipment, academic courses or conferences (e.g. 
Gemünden et al., 1996). Another form of collaboration is the development of joint 
prototypes. Network collaboration with academia also frequently results in the 
acquisition of highly-educated scientists and industrial PhD students. Additionally, 
academic or semi-academic institutions often play an important role to constitute 
and/or govern innovation networks and to acquire subsidies (e.g. Carpinetti et al., 
2007). Empirical studies progressively indicate that firms that regularly collaborate 
with academia seem to have a higher radical innovation output, while incremental 
innovators tend to collaborate regularly with customers as innovation partners 
(Biemans, 1991; Gemünden et al., 1996) and firms that have products/services new 
to a specific market are more likely to collaborate with suppliers and consultants 
(see e.g. Baiman and Rajan, 2002; Ragatz et al., 1997). 
(3) Customers: Most of all, customer involvement can lead to product innovations by 
providing user know-how and performing prototype tests (user-driven innovation), 
as well as by defining the new requirements in the market place (Gemünden et al., 
1996).  
(4) Other partners: Collaboration with consultancies can provide concept development 
and structuring of processes, as well as financial, legal and other support 
(Gemünden et al., 1996). Further, partners in the financial sector can open or 
facilitate access to means (bank loans, venture capital, etc.) to finance innovations 
(Kesting, 2007). 
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Granovetter’s weak tie theory 
 
In SMEs, innovation is generated by all kinds of accumulated complex information, 
often driven by clients and changes in raw material supplies, or intuition, the 
organization’s knowledge and know-how (Pacitto et al. 2002). Such information is 
complemented or enriched by networks that may be linked to environmental scanning 
systems, usually informal in nature in SMEs (Julien et al. 1999). Granovetter’s (1973, 
1982) sociological theory identifies two main types of networks, namely strong tie 
networks and weak tie networks. Granovetter proposed that weak rather than strong 
ties are appropriate for access to new information and weak signals. He associated 
strong (weak) ties with a dense (sparse) structure. In frequent and intense interaction 
between many actors, in a dense structure, much of the information circulating in the 
system is redundant.  
 
There are several types of networks in the small business sector, namely personal, 
business and information networks. Personal networks, which are specific to an 
individual entrepreneur, are generally composed of one or two friends, key staff 
members and one or two colleagues from school or university (Birley et al. 1991, Julien 
1995). Business networks are composed of sources with which the firm currently does 
business, including suppliers, equipment providers, distributors, transporters and so on. 
Information networks, unlike personal and business networks, may provide weak or 
strong signals. They complement the information obtained from the other networks to 
support the firm’s ongoing development. Information sources can be divided into 
personal and impersonal, and again into formal and informal sources. Research has 
shown that small business managers turn most frequently to informal personal sources 
from their personal networks. These sources include clients, staff members, salespeople 
and suppliers (Julien 1995). Formal sources provide raw information that must be 
sorted and interpreted. They include specialized publications, brochures and catalogues, 
business magazines, government publications and other reports. Among weak signal 
sources, some are related more specifically to new technologies. Such sources are 
located principally in research and educational communities and government 
organizations. They are composed mainly of research centres and universities, scientific 
advisors and other related public organizations (Smeltzer et al. 1991). Generally 
speaking, they are entities with which the entrepreneur has little contact, because of 
their hermetic language and very different concerns, but they can nevertheless provide a 
lot of new information (Ansoff 1975, Hansen 1999). They are particularly important in 
that they help entrepreneurs think beyond what is known and spot new opportunities 
(Hills et al. 1999). 
 
The research described builds on the Granvetters theory of weak tie networks, 
associated with e.g. research institutes, business associations and similar entities, with 
whom SMEs do not have regular contact. More specifically, our goal is to see whether 
SMEs in contact with weak signal networks are more future oriented than those that 
generally limit themselves to stronger signal networks.  
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According to the Julien, Andriambeloson and Ramangalahy (2004), three different 
types of networks (strong signal, weak signal and intermediary) are composed of a 
certain number of information sources all translating the same concept: 
(1) Sources making up the strong signal networks: clients, suppliers, subcontractors, 
financial institutions, competitors, strategic alliances; 
(2) Intermediary sources making up the other formal and informal information 
networks: specialized publications, brochures, catalogues, newspapers, TV, radio, 
fairs and exhibitions; 
(3) Sources making up the weak signal networks: Government agencies, other 
consultants, universities, colleges, industrial research centres, local associations of 
companies and business people, technology consultants, standardization agencies, 
sector-based associations (such as national or European technology platforms). 
 
Each source would be measured on a 4-point ordinal scale ranging from 1 (never any 
contact) to 4 (always in contact). 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Strong tie networks tend to be composed of the same type of people, and the 
information they can provide is often redundant or repetitive. They are therefore not a 
significant channel for new ideas, but serve instead, as said earlier, to confirm the 
opinions of their members and, in the case of entrepreneurs, to consolidate their 
business decisions. In contrast, weak tie networks are composed of people who are not 
used to working together. They facilitate the circulation of new ideas, and hence 
innovation, precisely because of these personal differences (Fine and Kleinman 1979). 
Ansoff (1975) said that, in such a case, although the signals may be ambiguous, 
fragmentary or uncertain, they can nevertheless be anticipatory in that they call existing 
knowledge into question or add new elements leading to innovation. Based on the above 
observations, the following two hypotheses are proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Weak tie networks are more likely than strong tie networks to provide 
access to weak signals and consequently to trigger value associated with foresight. 
 
Given the specific context of Lithuanian SMEs – small domestic market, extremely 
closed research and innovation community, the following hypothesis is also proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Involvement in international weak tie networks (e.g. European 
Technology Platforms) are more likely than involvement in national networks to 
provide access to weak signals and consequently to trigger value associated with 
foresight. 
  
The availability of new information is not sufficient, of itself, for creating value. If its 
meaning is to be understood, the information has to be decoded, collected and converted 
into knowledge, know-how and decisions. Companies need a certain organizational 
capacity to “absorb” the information, give it meaning and convert it into knowledge or 
varying levels (intensities) of innovation and other types of value associated with 
foresight. Based on these observations, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
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Hypothesis 7: Better developed cultural characteristics of the firm have positive effect 
on the impact of networks generally providing weak signals. 
 
 
2.4. Value associated with Corporate Foresight 
 
What could be the value of conducting corporate foresight for a small and medium sized 
enterprise? Past research provides important insights. Foresight is believed to having a 
positive impact on innovation success (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). In general, a 
benefit is seen as soon as the results from the foresight activities are used for decision-
making. Furthermore, the early warning provided and the created awareness of 
opportunities is a great benefit as such (Ashton, 1991). Bürgel et al. (2005) consider 
foresight activities being successful, if due to those earnings are made or loss is 
prevented, new successful projects and programmes are initiated, decision-making is 
enabled, communication is improved, business units and customers are satisfied, and/ or 
a corporate R&D strategy is supported. It has been shown that there may be several 
internal stakeholders that can be expected to profit from corporate foresight, particularly 
as regards the improvement in strategic decision making (Nick, 2008),  or by exploring 
new markets (Slaughter, 1997) and new products and services (Becker, 2002).  
Slaughter (1996) and Davison (2001) suggest to monetarily estimating foreseen threats, 
to compare it to the costs of the foresight activities and therewith to calculate the cost 
savings created by foresight. The output of CF activities is suggested to be measured by 
objective fulfilment, decision-maker satisfaction, and prediction accuracy, and money 
made/saved. Rauscher (2004) differentiates the monetarily assessment of opportunities 
and risks, and of the reactions to them. Rauscher chose the shareholder value for 
measuring the contribution of CF.  
 
More recently, Davis established a set of impacts on the basis of expert interviews. 
These impacts are still on different levels and thus difficult to relate to the activities in 
corporate foresight, but they help show that corporate has the potential to provide a 
wide range of benefits. The impacts identified by Davis are (1) broadening the horizon 
of top management, (2) identifying influencing factors on current and future business, 
(3) enhancing market understanding, (4) enhancing strategic focus and guidance, and 
(5) intensifying internal networks (Davis, 2008).  The mentioned approaches of 
measuring value creation are some of the few discussed in literature. There is definitely 
a need for further research on this topic. 
 
Adapting the future orientation maturity model by Rohrbeck (2010), operationalisation 
of value variables is structured into three categories: 
(1) Reduction of uncertainty category refers to these characteristics: (a) early warning 
(early identification of major discontinuous change in three past years); (b) 
challenging basic assumptions and dominant business logic; (c) improve decision 
making due to horizon scanning (i.e. horizon scanning results are used to backup 
decisions regularly and have contributed to improve decision making);  
(2) Triggering own actions category refers to these characteristics: (a) trigger 
innovation activities (R&D) (i.e. start of new innovation activities in the past three 
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years); (b) react to external threats (i.e. in the past three years multiple threats were 
discovered early and led to projects designed to identify countermeasures); (c) 
support to strategic decision making (i.e. horizon scanning influenced the strategic 
policies of the organisation); (d) effects on marketing and sales (i.e. horizon 
scanning contributed to enhancing the image of the organisation towards its 
stakeholders); 
(3) Influencing others (other companies, national governments, other stakeholders) to 
act. Previous research has emphasized that the future is uncertain and not 
predetermined; this means that it is constructed by individual actions (Blass, 2003).  
This category is broken to these characteristics: (a) influencing other companies 
(i.e. in the past three years we achieved to influence other companies on multiple 
occasions); (b) influencing national governments; (c) influencing other 
stakeholders). 
 
3. Discussion and conclusions 
 
 
The paper proposes a framework of foresight capabilities for measuring existence of 
foresight capabilities in SMEs. It is hypothesized, following Rohrbeck et al (2010) that 
effective corporate foresight can be organized without a process model but with certain 
capabilities and activities. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that organizational future 
orientation of an SME can be also enhanced by engaging in networks with other 
stakeholders. It is proposed that Granovetter’s theory of weak tie networks could be 
applied for measuring the routes how SMEs without institutionalised foresight methods 
or activities get access to information on weak signals – important indicators for 
identifying discontinuous change. 
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Figure 2. Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In my analysis, I am interested not only in the existence of certain foresight capabilities 
in Lithuanian SMEs; I am also interested if the clusters of capabilities are inter-related. 
Therefore, a list of hypotheses is preliminary formulated. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Larger companies tend to have higher institutionalisation of foresight 
capabilities in-house. 
Hypothesis 2: The more dynamic the internal and external environment of the 
company, the more dynamic its view on strategy, and the more it will use 
advanced methods of futures research in its strategy process. 
Hypothesis 3: The more developed are information usage and communication capacity 
characteristics, the higher value achieved. 
Hypothesis 4: The more developed are the cultural characteristics, the higher the value 
characteristics associated with foresight. 
Hypothesis 5: Weak tie networks (e.g. collaboration with academia) are more likely 
than strong tie networks to provide access to weak signals and 
consequently to trigger value associated with foresight. 
Hypothesis 6: Involvement in international weak tie networks (e.g. European 
Technology Platforms) are more likely than involvement in national 
networks to provide access to weak signals and consequently to trigger 
value associated with foresight. 
Hypothesis 7: Better developed cultural characteristics of the firm have positive effect 
on the impact of networks generally providing weak signals. 
 
Further research will be conducted to test and validate the proposed framework in 
Lithuanian SMEs.  
R2. CULTURAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
R1. STRUCTURAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
(institutionalised CF) 
R3. NETWORK 
CHARACTERISTICS (strong 
/ weak tie networks) 
CONTEXT AND GENERAL 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
VALUE ELEMENTS 
27 
 
References  
 
Ansoff, I. H. (1975): Managing Strategic Surprise by Response to Weak Signals, California 
Management Review, vol. 18, no. 2 
Ansoff, I.H. (1980): Strategic issue management, Strategic Management Journals 1 
Ashton, W. B./ Stacey, G. S. (1995): Technical intelligence in business: Understanding 
technology threats and opportunities; In: International Journal of Technology Management; 
10; 1 
Bartkus, E. V. (2010). Smulkaus ir vidutinio verslo pletros prognozes Lietuvoje 
ekonomines krizes pradzioje., 187 
Bernatonyte, D., Vilke, R., & Volochovic, A. (2009). Regional peculiarities of 
developments of Lithuanian SME.  
Becker, P. 2003. Corporate foresight in Europe: a first overview. European Commission 
Community Research Working Paper, Luxembourg. 
Bernhardt, D. (1994): I want it fast, factual, actionable. Tailoring competitive intelligence to 
executives’ needs; In: Long Range Planning; 27. 
Burmeister K., Jannek K. (2007): Corporate foresight in small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Foresight Brief No.101 
[http://www.z-punkt.de/fileadmin/be_user/D_Publikationen/D_Fachartikel/EFMN_Brief_101_Corporate_Foresight_SME.pdf] 
Camagni, R. (1993). Inter-Firm Industrial Networks: The Costs and benefits of 
Cooperative Behaviour. Journal of Industry Studies. 1 (1) 
Coates, J. F./ Mahaffie, J. B./ Hines, A. (1994): Technological-Forecasting - 1970-1993; In: 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change; 47; 1. 
Cuhls, K. (2003): From forecasting to foresight processes - New participative foresight 
activities in Germany; In: Journal of Forecasting; 22 
Cunha, J.V., Cunha, M.P. & Faia-Correia, M. (2001): Scenarios for improvisation: Long range 
planning redeemed. Journal of General Management, 27(2) 
Cunha, Miguel Pina E. (2004): Time Travelling, Organisational Foresight as Temporal 
Reflexivity, in Tsoukas, Shepherd (eds): Managing the Future Foresight in the Knowledge 
Economy, Blackwell Publishing 2004.  
D’Aveni, R.A. (1994): Hypercompetition: Managing the dynamics of strategic maneuvering. 
Free Press, New York.  
Day G.S., Schoemaker P.J.H. (2004): Driving through the fog: managing at the edge, 
Long Range Planning 37  
28 
 
Da Costa, O., P. Warnke, F. Scapolo, and C. Cagnin. (2006): Contribution of the FORLEARN 
project to the study of foresight impact on policy-making. Paper presented at the 
International Seminar on ‘Future-Oriented Technology Analysis (FTA)’, Seville, 28–29 
September 2006. Brussels: European Commission. 
Daheim, C. and Gereon Uerz, G. (2008): Corporate foresight in Europe: from trend based logics 
to open foresight. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, Vol. 20, No. 3 
A. De Geus, The living company, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass, 1997. 
Drucker, P.F. (1997): The future that has already happened. Harvard Business Review, 75(5). 
Dunn Mark G., Norburn David, Birley Sue (1994): The Impact of Organizational Values, Goals, 
and Climate on Marketing Effectiveness, Journal of Business Research, Jun94, Vol. 30 
Issue 2 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989): Building Theories from Case Study Research.” Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 
Eisenhardt K.M., Martin J.A. (2000): Dynamic capabilities: what are they? Strategic 
Management Journal 21  
European Commission (2005). Report on European Technology Platforms and Joint 
Technology Initiatives: fostering public-private R&D partnerships to boost 
Europe’s industrial competitiveness 
European Commission (2008). Evaluation of the European Technology Platforms 
(ETPs).  
European Commission (2009). European SMEs under Pressure. Annual Report on EU 
SMEs 
Fonseca, J. (2002): Complexity and innovation in organizations. Routledge, London. 
Fuller and Peter de Smedt (2008): Modernisation of foresight methodology: Reflexivity and the 
social construction of knowledge, A note to authors in COSTA22 
Gibbons et al (1994): The New Production of Knowledge: The dynamics of science and 
research in contemporary societies. Sage Publications, London. 
Georghiou, L. (2001): Third Generation Foresight: Integrating the Socio-economic 
Dimension, in: Technology Foresight – the approach to and potential for New 
Technology Foresight, Conference proceedings, NISTEP Research Material. 
Georghiou, L.; Harper, J.; Keenan, M.; Miles, I.; Popper, R. (2008): The Handbook of 
Technology Foresight - Concepts and Practice, Edward Elgar, 456 
Gilad, Benjamin (2004): Early Warning: Using Competitive Intelligence to Anticipate 
Market Shifts, Control Risk, and Create Powerful Strategies, Amacom, New York 
NY, USA. 
29 
 
Godet M. (1997): Scenarios and Strategies. A Toolbox for Problem Solving. Cahiers du 
LIPS, Special Issue; Paris. 
Harvie, C. (2010). Firm Characteristic Determinants of SME Participation in 
Production Networks.  
Hamel, G. & Prahalad, C.K. (1994): Competing for the Future, Boston, Harvard 
Business School Press  
Isaksen, A., (1993). Specialized production areas in the Nordic Countries. Uppsala, 
Graphic Systems, Stockholm, 1993. 
Jannek, K., & Burmeister, K. (2008). Corporate Foresight in Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises SMEs. Foresight, (101), 1-4. 
Julien, Andriambeloson, Ramangalahy (2004). Networks, weak signals and 
technological innovations among SMEs in the land-based transportation. 
equipment sector. Entrepreneurship and regional development, 16 
Kesting, P. (2007). HRM implications for network collaboration of small and medium 
sized companies.  
Ketels, C. H. M. (2003). The Development of the cluster concept – present experiences 
and further developments. Strategy, 1-25. 
Karp, T. (2004): Building Foresight Abilities in Organisations-A Future Opportunity for 
Futures Studies Futures Research Quarterly: Summer 2004, Volume 20, Number 2  
Lado Nora, Maydeau-Olivares Albert and Rivera Jaime (1998): Measuring market orientation in 
several populations – A structural equations model. European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 
32  
D. Levinthal, Surviving Schumpeterian environments: an evolutionary perspective, Ind. 
Corp. Change 1 (January 1, 1992) 427–443. 
Loveridge, Denis (2003): Foresight. Programme of Policy Research in Engineering, 
Science and Technology (PREST), University of Manchester  
Martin, B. R. (1995): Foresight in Science and Technology; In: Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management; 7; 2 
Martin, Ben and John Irvine (1989): Research Foresight: Priority-setting in science, 
Pinter Publishers: London and New York 48  
R.C. May, W.H. Stewart, R. Sweo, Environmental scanning behavior in a transitional 
economy: evidence from Russia, Acad. Manage. J. 43 (Jun 2000) 
Mendonça, Sandro; Cunha, Miguel Pina e; Jari Kaivo-oja; Frank Ruff (2004): Wild 
cards, weak signals and organisational improvisation, Futures 36.  
Mintzberg H. (1994): The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. Prentice Hall 
International: New York, London, Toronto.  
30 
 
Mockaitis, A. I. (2006). The internationalisation efforts of Lithuanian firms – strategy or 
luck? Economic Policy. 
Müller, A. 2006: Strategic foresight in companies. An international survey on trends 
and futures research processes. Unpublished paper. Available at 
http://www.strategicforesight.ch  
Neef, A.; Daheim, C. (2005): Corporate Foresight – The European Experience. In: 
Wagner, Cynthia G. (ed.): Fore-sight, Innovation, and Strategy – Toward a Wiser 
Future. World Future Society  
Ohmae, K. (1982): The Mind of the Strategist, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Penrose, E. (1959): The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Wiley, New York. 
Scott G. (2001): Strategic planning for high-tech product development. Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management 3 
Slaughter, R. A. (1996): Foresight beyond strategy: Social initiatives by business and 
government; In: Long Range Planning; 29; 2 
Porter ME. (1996): What Is strategy? In Porter ME. (ed). On Competition, Harvard 
Business School: Boston. MA. 
Porter, A. L., et al. (2004): Technology futures analysis: Toward integration of the field 
and new methods; In: Technological Forecasting and Social Change; 71; 3 
Patton, K. M. (2005): The role of scanning in open intelligence systems; In: 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change; 72; 9 
Porter A. L. et. al (2004): Technology futures analysis: toward integration of the field 
and new methods, Technological Forecasting & Social Change 71  
Reger, G. (2001): Technology foresight in companies: From an indicator to a network 
and process perspective; In: Technology Analysis & Strategic Management; 13; 4 
Rohrbeck, R./ Arnold, H. M./ Heuer, J. (2007): Strategic Foresight in multinational enterprises – 
a case study on the Deutsche Telekom Laboratories; In: ISPIM-Asia 2007; New Delhi. 
Rohrbeck, R. / H. G. Gemünden (2007): The road ahead for research on strategic foresight: 
Insights from the 1st European conference on Strategic Foresight, 1st European Conference 
on Strategic Foresight; Berlin, Germany  
Rohrbeck, R., Hölzle K. and H.G. Gemünden (2009): Opening up for competitive advantage – 
How Deutche Telekom creates an open innovation ecosystem. R&D Management, 39(4) 
Rohrbeck (2010): Chapter 5.8: Involving Every Employee to Manage Discontinuous Change”, 
In: Rohrbeck, R. 2010. Corporate Foresight: Towards a Maturity Model for the Future 
Orientation of a Firm.   Heidelberg and New York: Physica-Verlag, Springer. 
31 
 
Rohrbeck, R., & Gemünden, H. G. (2010): Corporate Foresight: It‘s Three Roles in Enhancing 
the innovation capacity of the firm.   Technological Forecasting and Social Change, In 
Press, Corrected Proof. 
Rohrbeck, R. (2010): Harnessing a network of experts for competitive advantage – Technology 
scouting in the ICT industry. R & D Management, 40(20)  
Rollwagen, I., Hofmann, J., & Schneider, S. (2008). Improving the business impact of 
foresight. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 20(3) 
Ruff, F. (2006): Corporate foresight: integrating the future business environment into innovation 
and strategy; In: International Journal of Technology Management; 34; 3-4 
Schoemaker, P. (1995): Scenario planning: a tool for strategic thinking, Sloan Management 
Review, Winter 
Schwarz, J.O. (2006): The Future of Futures Studies: A Delphi Study with a German 
Perspective. Aachen: Shaker. 
Teece D.J., Pisano G., Shuen A. (1997): Dynamic capabilities and strategic 
management, Strategic Management Journal 18  
Tsoukas, H./ Shepherd, J. (2004): Coping with the future: developing organizational 
foresightfulness - Introduction; In: Futures; 36; 2 
Van der Duin, P. (2006). Qualitative futures research for innovation. Delft: Eburon Academic 
Publishers. 
Van der Heijden, Kees (1996): Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, Wiley, Chichester, 
UK. 
Von Hippel, E. (1988): Lead users. A source of novel product concepts. Management Science 
32. 
Weick, K. E. (1993): The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 38 
 
 
